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Wisconsin Sentence Modification: A View from the Trial Court
Abstract
In Wisconsin, trial courts have discretion to modify a defendant's criminal sentence if the defendant
introduces a "new factor." Published Wisconsin case law gives little guidance on what constitutes a new factor.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has declined to find a new factor present in every case it has published since
defining "new factor" in 1978. Because of ambiguous and conflicting rulings, the standards for both prongs of
the new factor definition remain unclear. This Comment attempts to shed light on the new factor requirement
for sentence modification by examining Wisconsin trial court decisions on a limited sample of sentence
modification motions. This study reveals that trial courts modified sentences in a variety of cases to effect their
intent in sentencing the defendant when it has been frustrated, to respond to a change in a defendant's health
or family circumstances, or to reward a defendant for cooperating with the district attorney after sentencing.
These grounds for sentence modification are offered in other states through statutory exceptions to the time
limits governing sentence modification motions. This Comment concludes that Wisconsin's sentence
modification law, though frought with confusion at the appellate level, nonetheless provides defendants with a
broader and more flexible form of post-con- viction relief than that provided in states where statues define the
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COMMENT
WISCONSIN SENTENCE MODIFICATION: A VIEW
FROM THE TRIAL COURT*
In Wisconsin, trial courts have discretion to modify a defendant's criminal
sentence if the defendant introduces a "new factor." Published Wisconsin case law
gives little guidance on what constitutes a new factor. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
has declined to find a new factor present in every case it has published since defining
"new factor" in 1978. Because of ambiguous and conflicting rulings, the standards
for both prongs of the new factor definition remain unclear. This Comment attempts
to shed light on the new factor requirement for sentence modification by examining
Wisconsin trial court decisions on a limited sample of sentence modification motions.
This study reveals that trial courts modified sentences in a variety of cases to effect
their intent in sentencing the defendant when it has been frustrated, to respond to a
change in a defendant's health or family circumstances, or to reward a defendant for
cooperating with the district attorney after sentencing. These grounds for sentence
modification are offered in other states through statutory exceptions to the time limits
governing sentence modification motions. This Comment concludes that Wisconsin's
sentence modification law, though frought with confusion at the appellate level,
nonetheless provides defendants with a broader and more flexible form of post-con-
viction relief than that provided in states where statues define the factors justifying a
sentence modification.
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Louis Brandeis called it "one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory" in implementing innovative laws or procedures.1
For almost twenty years, Wisconsin has been such a laboratory in the
area of criminal sentence modification. Wisconsin trial courts retain ju-
risdiction to modify sentences they have imposed if a defendant asserts
a "new factor." In contrast, sixteen states follow the common law rule
that a trial court loses jurisdiction to modify a criminal sentence when
the sentence commences.2 Twenty-eight states and the District of Co-
* In researching this Comment, the authors used the files and resources of the Legal
Assistance to Institutionalized Persons (LAIP) program at the University of Wisconsin Law
School. The staff of dedicated attorneys and office workers at LAIP were of great help in locating
closed files and remembering old clients. They also provided input into drafts of this Comment and
moral support for the topic of this Comment from the beginning. In particular, the authors wish to
acknowledge the contributions of John Pray and Ken Lund.
1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. Rogers v. State, 265 Ark. 945, 582 S.W.2d 7 (1979) (the trial court has power to
modify a sentence only within the term of court and before executing the sentence); People v.
Getty, 50 Cal. App. 3d 101, 123 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1975) (the trial court's jurisdiction ends when the
sentence commences); Kohlfuss v. Warden of Conn. State Prison, 149 Conn. 692, 183 A.2d 626,
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 928 (1962) (trial court has no power to modify a sentence after it com-
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lumbia have amended the common law rule to give the sentencing court
jurisdiction to modify sentences for a limited time after imposing
them.' Since these time limits are relatively short, sentence modification
governed by time limits often cannot provide defendants with relief
from hardships caused by changes in circumstances.
States have developed two ways of responding to hardships based
on changes in circumstances. First, in Wisconsin and three other states,
the courts define conditions under which defendants may bring sen-
mences); People v. Wilson, I I I Mich. App. 770, 315 N.W.2d 423 (1981) (trial court has no power
to modify a sentence after it commences); Harrigill v. State, 403 So. 2d 867 (Miss. 198 1) (trial court
is powerless to alter or vacate sentence after the term of court ends); State v. Burroughs, 559
S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (trial court loses jurisdiction when the sentence commences); State
v. Porter, 143 Mont. 528, 540, 391 P.2d 704, 711 (1964) (once a valid sentence is imposed, the court
loses jurisdiction to vacate or modify it); State v. Adamson, 194 Neb. 592, 233 N.W.2d 925 (1975)
(trial court loses the power to modify the sentence upon execution); State v. Thomson, 110 N.H.
190, 263 A.2d 675 (1970) (trial court loses jurisdiction when the sentence commences); State v.
Bonds, 45 N.C. App. 62, 262 S.E.2d 340 (1980) (trial court loses jurisdiction at the end of the
session); State ex rel. Gladden v. Kelly, 213 Or. 197, 324 P.2d 486 (1958) (trial court loses jurisdic-
tion when the sentence commences); State v. Patterson, 272 S.C. 2, 249 S.E.2d 770 (1978) (trial
court loses jurisdiction when the term of court expires); Ex parte Reynolds, 462 S.W.2d 605 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1970) (trial court's jurisdiction expires when the sentence commences); State v. Beck,
584 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978) (court loses jurisdiction upon commencement of sentence); State v.
Wells, 7 Wash. App. 553, 500 P.2d 1012 (1972) (court has no power to modify except for limited
circumstances such as a clerical error or fraud). See also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 430. 10 (McKin-
ney 1983) (sentence may not be changed once the term of the sentence has commenced); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-303 (Supp. 1988) (jurisdiction terminates when defendant is received by the Depart-
ment of Corrections, however, the trial court retains jurisdiction over a defendant sentenced to jail
until the expiration of the sentence).
3. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35(a) (trial court may modify a sentence within 60 days of its
imposition); ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 24.3 (60 days); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (120 days); DEL. SUPER.
CT. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (60 days); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (120 days); FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.800(b) (60 days; the provision does not apply to the death sentence or certain other mandatory
sentences); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1(a) (Supp. 1988) (trial court may modify a sentence within the
term of court or 60 days, whichever is greater); IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 35 (120 days); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, 1005-8-1(c) (Smith-Hurd 1982) (30 days; the Illinois statute specifies certain circum-
stances under which a court may modify a sentence after the time limit has expired. See infra note
5); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-17 (Burns Supp. 1988) (180 days; the statute allows a trial court to
modify a sentence after 180 days if the district attorney agrees); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 902.4, 903.2
(West Supp. 1988) (the time limit for felonies is 90 days, 30 days for misdemeanors; the statute
does not apply to mandatory sentences); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4603(3) (1981) (120 days); ME. R.
CRIM. P. 35 (one year); MD. R.P. 4-345(b) (90 days; the statute allows modification at any time
when the sentence is for desertion or non-support. See infra note 4); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 29(a) (60
days); N.J. CT. R. 3:21-10(a) (60 days; the statute also provides specific circumstances under which
a court may modify a sentence after the time limit. See infra note 5); N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-801 (30
days; the statute does not apply if the death penalty or a mandatory sentence is imposed); N.D. R.
CRIM. P. 35(b) (120 days); OKLA. R. CRIM. P. ch. 16, § 982a(A) (120 days; the statute does not
apply if the defendant is a convicted felon who has been in prison for a prior felony within the past
10 years); PA. R. CRIM. P. 1410 (10 days); R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 35 (120 days); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 23A-31-1 (1988) (one year); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 35 (120 days); VT. R. CRIM. P. 35(b)
(90 days); W.VA. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (one year); Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 36 (120 days). See also Jones v.
State, 55 Ala. App. 466, 316 So. 2d 713 (Ala. Crim. App. 1975) (trial court loses jurisdiction after
30 days); State v. Le Vasseur, I Haw. App. 19, 613 P.2d 1328 (1980) (90 days); Silverburg v.
Commonwealth, 587 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1979) (10 days).
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tence modification motions.4 Second, several state legislatures have en-
acted statutory exceptions to the time limit controlling the trial court's
jurisdiction to hear sentence modification motions. These statutory
provisions allow the trial court to modify a sentence past the statutory
or common law time limit under specified circumstances or if specified
events occur.5
This Comment examines the Wisconsin common law sentence
modification system at the trial court level. It analyzes a limited sample
of "new factor" motions brought by defendants serving sentences in
Wisconsin correctional institutions. These motions reveal that Wiscon-
sin trial courts have developed sentence modification into a flexible
postconviction remedy despite the failure of Wisconsin appellate courts
to articulate a clear definition of a new factor. At the same time, trial
courts respected and applied policy limitations articulated in appellate
decisions. Interestingly, the statutes in other states creating exceptions
to jurisdictional time limits collectively cover many of the grounds that
Wisconsin trial courts have accepted as new factors. The statutory ex-
4. Louisiana and Maryland allow trial courts to exercise continuing jurisdiction over
sentences, but limit the type of sentences that the courts have the authority to modify. See LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 881 (West Supp. 1988) (allows trial courts to reduce the sentence of a
misdemeanant or of a felon who has been sentenced to prison without hard labor); MD. R.P. 4-
345(b) (allows modification at any time when the sentence is for desertion or non-support; other-
wise, a 90-day limit applies. See supra note 3). Other than Wisconsin, Nevada is the only state
where the trial court exercises wide discretion in sentence modification. In Nevada, a trial court
may modify a sentence that was based on "materially untrue assumptions" which work to the
"exteme detriment" of the defendant. State v. District Court, 100 Nev. 90, 97, 677 P.2d 1044, 1048-
49 (1984).
5. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 1005-8-1() (Smith-Hurd 1982) (defendant who must return
to Illinois to serve an unexpired Illinois sentence after having served a term of imprisonment in
another jurisdiction may apply to the Illinois trial court to have the Illinois sentence reduced; the
defendant must apply for sentence reduction within 30 days of completing the other sentence);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-17 (Bums 1985) (trial court may modify a sentence after the 180-day
statutory limit if the district attorney agrees); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09 (11 )(a) (West Supp. 1989)
(trial court may modify a sentence if the mandatory sentencing guidelines for the crime change);
N.J. CT. R. 3:21-10(b) (specifies several exceptions to the time limit; court may modify a sentence
to allow a defendant to take advantage of a custodial or non-custodial drug or alcohol treatment
program; court may modify a sentence to release a defendant because of the defendant's illness or
infirmity; court may modify a sentence upon the joint application of the defendant and the prose-
cuting attorney); OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.51 (Anderson 1987) (trial court may suspend the
sentence and place defendant on probation: any time before the defendant is delivered to the
institution; between 30 and 90 days after the defendant has gone to prison; for a misdemeanant, at
any time); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-60 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (amends the common law rule by al-
lowing a trial court to modify a sentence at any time in order to reflect a defendant's prior convic-
tions which were not taken into consideration at sentencing).
Many states have statutes allowing trial courts to modify a sentence at any time to correct
clerical errors in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 24.4; COLO. R.
CRIM. P. 36; DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 36; D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 36 (special provisions
for correcting errors in the transcript); IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 36; IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38- 1-15 (Burns
1985); ME. R. CRIM. P. 36; NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.565 (1987); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 36; R.I. SUPER. CT.
R. CraM. P. 36; VT. R. CRIM. P. 36; W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 36.
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ceptions fail, however, to duplicate the flexibility of Wisconsin's com-
mon law remedy.
This Comment is based on a study of all sentence modification
motions filed by the Legal Assistance to Institutionalized Persons
(LAIP) program from 1978 through the summer of 1987.6 To collect
the data upon which this Comment is based, the authors reviewed
LAIP records on all files closed in that period. Where the "close-out"
form" indicated that a sentence modification motion had been filed, the
authors collected data from the file.' The study cannot predict the sta-
tistical probability of success of any particular new factor because it
covers only a limited number of motions which were brought primarily
by one organization.9 Because its resources are limited, LAIP repre-
sents an individual on a sentence modification only if there is a signifi-
cant likelihood that the motion will be successful.'" Therefore, this
study may reflect a success rate for particular grounds which is higher
than the success rate for a random sample of sentence modification
motions.
In addition to the new factor ground, a defendant may bring a
sentence modification motion based on abuse of discretion. 1 Because
6. LAIP is a clinical program associated with the University of Wisconsin Law School.
Its purpose is to provide an educational experience for law students and to assist indigent persons
who are serving criminal sentences and mental health commitments in Wisconsin institutions.
Each LAIP attorney manages the cases from one or more Wisconsin institutions. They are respon-
sible for assigning cases to law students and supervising the law students' work on these cases.
Interview with Ken Lund, LAIP Director, in Madison, Wis. (Apr. 7, 1988).
7. Students or staff attorneys complete close-out forms when the issues which LAIP is
handling for a client are resolved. The close-out forms contain a brief description of the problems
for which the client requested assistance and the action that LAIP took to resolve each issue.
8. This information included the crimes for which the defendant had originally been
sentenced; the length of the original sentence; the name of the sentencing judge and the county in
which the defendant was originally sentenced; the amount of time served when the sentence modi-
fication motion was filed; the grounds for the motion; the disposition of the motion; and any
reasoning that the judge gave in support of his or her decision on the motion. The authors relied on
file records including sentence modification motions, memoranda in support of motions, opposing
memoranda, orders and written decisions on the motions, correspondence, records of telephone
conversations, memoranda to the file, written communication between the student and the super-
vising attorney, sentencing orders and decisions, and prison records.
9. The authors examined over 100 sentence modification motions from circuit courts in
67 counties. Forty-two alleged new factors. Although most of the motions were brought by LAIP,
the LAIP files sometimes contained information about other sentence modification motions filed
by an LAIP client either pro se or with the assistance of another attorney. When there was enough
data on these non-LAIP motions, they were also included in the study.
10. Interview with Ken Lund, LAIP Director, in Madison, Wis. (Apr. 7, 1988). In 1985,
LAIP opened files for 145 inmates who requested help with a sentence modification, but it filed
only 13 motions. In 1986, 12 motions were filed, out of 175 requests. LAIP does not open files for
many requests. Requests for which LAIP did not open a file are not reflected in these numbers.
11. State v. Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d 467, 480, 230 N.W.2d 665, 673 (1975) (trial court has
jurisdiction to reduce a defendant's sentence for abuse of discretion if it finds the sentence unduly
harsh or unconscionable, but it must state its reasons for the reduction on the record).
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of the apparent time limit on motions based on abuse of discretion,' 2
and their lack of utility as a unique post-conviction remedy, 13 the re-
mainder of this Comment will address only the new factor ground for
sentence modification.
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of sentence modifica-
tion in Wisconsin, tracing the development of the new factor ground,
and giving a brief overview of appellate rulings on what constitutes a
new factor. It also examines two major flaws in the Wisconsin new fac-
tor definition. Part III outlines a variety of grounds that defendants
have asserted as new factors in sentence modification motions, analyz-
ing the purposes that sentence modification has served and the policies
that trial courts invoke in deciding sentence modification motions. In
Part IV, the grounds accepted for sentence modification in Wisconsin's
common law sentence modification system are briefly compared to stat-
utory exceptions in other states. This Comment concludes that, despite
confusing and conflicting case law, trial courts have developed Wiscon-
sin's common law sentence modification into a post-conviction remedy
which is more flexibile than the statutory exceptions in other states.
II. HISTORY OF SENTENCE MODIFICATION IN WISCONSIN
A. Development of the New Factor Test
In 1970, the Wisconsin Supreme Court amended the common law
rule that a trial court has no power to revise its sentence in a criminal
case after the sentence has commenced.' 4 The court, in Hayes v. State,
ruled that the ninety-day time limit for new trial motions should also
control the time within which motions to modify sentences may be
brought.'
5
12. Case law is not clear on whether trial courts have jurisdiction to hear sentence modi-
fication motions based on abuse of discretion after the time limit for new trial motions has expired.
In 1975, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the 90-day time limit of Hayes v. State, 46 Wis.
2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970), should control when abuse of discretion is alleged and no new
factor is presented. Jones (Hollis) v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 62, 73, 233 N.w.2d 441, 447 (1975). In
Klimas v. State, however, the supreme court asserted the regulatory nature of the time limit and
held that the trial court had discretion to entertain a sentence modification motion based on abuse
of discretion after the 90-day limit had expired. Klimas v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 244, 246, 249 N.W.2d
285, 286 (1976). The Wisconsin Supreme Court most recently addressed the issue in a footnote in
State v. Macemon, 113 Wis. 2d 662, 335 N.W.2d 402 (1983). The court ruled that after the time
limit only an appellate court may review a sentence for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 668 n.3, 335
N.W.2d at 406 n.3.
13. See Comment, Sentence Modification by Wisconsin Trial Courts, 1985 Wis. L. REV.
195, 231 (arguing that abuse of discretion motions in the trial court duplicate the appellate court
function and appear to be a futile remedy).
14. Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 101, 175 N.W.2d 625, 629 (1970). See infra note 24.
15. Hayes, 46 Wis. 2d at 106, 175 N.W.2d at 631. In 1984, the Wisconsin Court of Ap-
peals ruled that a change in the time limit for bringing motions for new trial from 90 days to a
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In subsequent cases, the Wisconsin Supreme Court extended a trial
court's authority to modify a criminal sentence past the ninety-day limit
set in Hayes. In Lange v. State,'6 the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled
that the ninety-day limit was regulatory only and did not, therefore,
affect the trial court's jurisdiction to hear sentence modification mo-
tions. 17 As a result, trial courts gained authority to grant sentence mod-
ifications even after the time limit expires.
Trial courts do not, however, have unlimited discretion to modify
sentences. For example, a sentencing court may not reduce a sentence
on "reflection" alone or simply because it has thought the matter over
and has second thoughts about the sentence it imposed. In State v.
Foellmi,'s the supreme court adopted as Wisconsin law a portion of a
draft of the American Bar Association's Standards Relating to Sentenc-
ing Alternatives and Procedures which said it may be appropriate for a
sentencing court to make a change in an imposed sentence if a new
factor is shown. 9 Although the court adopted this standard as a guide-
line, it did not define the term "new factor."
In 1975, the Wisconsin Supreme Court defined "new factor" in
Rosado v. State.20 The court stated that a new factor is
a fact or set of facts highly relevant to the imposition of sen-
tence, but not known to the trial judge at the time of original
sentencing, either because it was not then in existence or be-
cause, even though it was then in existence, it was unknow-
ingly overlooked by all of the parties.2
period of up to 165 days superseded the 90-day limit set forth in Hayes for sentence modification
motions. State v. Krueger, 119 Wis. 2d 327, 332, 351 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Ct. App. 1984).
As previously noted, many jurisdictions have made similar amendments to the common law
rule by allowing trial courts a limited number of days after imposing sentence during which it has
discretion to modify a defendant's sentence. See supra note 3.
16. 54 Wis. 2d 569, 196 N.W.2d 680 (1972).
17. Id. at 573, 196 N.W.2d at 682-83.
18. 57 Wis. 2d 572, 582, 205 N.W.2d 144, 150 (1973).
19. The court adopted the following portion of Part VI, § 6.1(a) of the 1968 approved
draft:
6.1 Authority to reduce: general.
(a) It may be appropriate to authorize the sentencing court to reduce or modify a
sentence within a specified time after its imposition or the final resolution of an
appeal if new factors bearing on the sentence are made known....
Foellmi, 57 Wis. 2d at 581, 205 N.W.2d at 149.
20. 70 Wis. 2d 280, 234 N.W.2d 69 (1975).
21. Id. at 288, 234 N.W.2d at 73. In a 1989 case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
the existence of a new factor is a question of law which the defendant must show by clear and
convincing evidence. State v. Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 434 N.W.2d 609, 611 (1989).
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In Rosado, however, the court held that the defendant had not shown a
new factor which fit this definition.22 Since articulating the new factor
definition in Rosado, the court has not ruled that any set of facts falls
within the definition.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court found new factors in only three
cases, all decided before Rosado.23 In two cases, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court affirmed trial court sentence reductions based on new
information about a defendant's prior record.24 In the third case, the
trial court had misunderstood the effect that a new parole law would
have on the defendant's parole eligibility.25 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court ruled that, in the circumstances of that case, correct information
about the defendant's parole eligibility was a new factor.26
22. In Rosado, the defendant pled guilty to one count of statutory rape brought against
him because of his affair with a 15-year-old girl. Id. at 283-84, 234 N.W.2d at 70-71. Although the
charge was based on the couple's activities in a Milwaukee hotel, the state introduced information
about their five-month trip to Puerto Rico where the defendant apparently left the girl stranded.
Id. at 284, 234 N.W.2d at 71. Rosado later moved for a sentence modification. He claimed that his
version of the Puerto Rican incident, which was not elicited at sentencing, was a new factor. Id. at
288, 234 N.W.2d at 73. The trial court refused to hear testimony on this point. It held that
Rosado's version of the incident was not a new factor because he had knowingly failed to testify to
it at the sentencing hearing. The factor was not, therefore, "unknowingly overlooked by all of the
parties." Id. at 288-89, 234 N.W.2d at 73.
23. Kutchera v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 534, 230 N.W.2d 750 (1975); Mattice v. State, 50 Wis.
2d 380, 184 N.W.2d 94 (1971); Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970). Kutchera was
decided under the Foellmi standard. See supra note 19. Mattice and Hayes were decided before any
standard was articulated.
24. In Hayes, the trial court reduced the defendant's sentence sua sponte after learning
that it had been misinformed as to the defendant's prior record. Hayes, 46 Wis. 2d at 106-07, 175
N.W.2d at 632. The court believed it had erred in imposing the maximum sentence on the defen-
dant because the defendant's criminal record was less serious than the court had understood. The
court assumed part of the responsibility for the misunderstanding because of the court's own
failure to request a pre-sentence report. The state appealed, alleging abuse of discretion, but the
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the trial court had sufficiently stated its reasons for
the modification.
An almost identical case was presented in Mattice. There, the trial court was presented with
evidence that the defendant had a more extensive criminal record than the court had believed.
Mattice, 50 Wis. 2d at 382, 184 N.W.2d at 95. Upon hearing additional evidence, the court re-
scinded the defendant's probation and imposed the three-year stayed sentence. Id. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, stating that the trial court had clearly set out its reasons for
the modification. Id.
25. Kutchera v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 534, 230 N.W.2d 750 (1975).
Comments by the prosecutor at sentencing about a defendant's parole eligibility alone do
not give rise to a new factor. In a 1989 case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a change in
parole policy after sentencing was not a new factor. State v. Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d 1,434 N.W.2d
609 (1989). The court distinguished Kutchera on the grounds that, in Kutchera, the trial court
expressly discussed parole policy on the record when making its sentencing decision. Id. at 14-15,
434 N.W.2d at 614. The extent of this requirement that the factor appear on the record is unclear.
In Franklin, the sentencing record may have had heightened importance because the sentencing
judge had retired and the defendant brought the modification motion before a different judge. Id.
at 6, 434 N.W.2d at 610.
26. Id. at 553, 230 N.W.2d at 760. In Kutchera, the defendant was convicted of seven
burglaries in two trials and sentenced to a total of 17 years. At the time the defendant's sentences
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Most of the published cases which discuss new factors have held
that a fact or set of facts is not a new factor. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court has explicitly ruled that disparity of sentences between co-defen-
dants is not a new factor.27 Disparity of sentence was also rejected as a
new factor when argued on the basis of Wisconsin's felony sentencing
guidelines.2" The court has made it clear that a defendant's rehabilita-
tive progress in a correctional institution may not be the basis of a sen-
tence reduction.2 9 Finally, the court rejected a reduction in the maxi-
mum penalty allowed by law for the defendant's crime as a basis for
sentence modification motions.3 °
were imposed, the district attorney stated that it was his understanding that unless the defendant
were given consecutive sentences, he could be paroled "almost instantly" under a new parole law.
Id. However, after Kutchera was sentenced, the supreme court ruled that concurrent as well as
consecutive sentences each have a minimum parole eligibility date of one year. Edelman v. State,
62 Wis. 2d 613, 215 N.W.2d 386 (1974). After Edelman was decided, the trial court modified
Kutchera's sentence, basing the modification on new information about the defendant's parole
eligibility. Kutchera, 69 Wis. 2d at 553, 230 N.W.2d at 760.
27. State v. Studler, 61 Wis. 2d 537, 213 N.W.2d 24 (1973). In Studler, the defendant
asserted that the trial court had abused its discretion by sentencing the defendant to 10 years for
armed robbery when another judge had sentenced the co-defendant to five years. Id. at 541, 213
N.W.2d at 25-26. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that a co-defendant's lesser sen-
tence is not a new factor. Id. In so ruling, the court cited the legislature's intent that Wisconsin
have a sentencing system where individuation rather than uniformity of sentences is the primary
goal. Id. at 542, 213 N.W.2d at 26.
28. State v. Macemon, 113 Wis. 2d 662, 669, 335 N.W.2d 402, 406 (1983). The felony
sentencing guidelines were developed by the Advisory Committee for the Wisconsin Felony Sen-
tencing Guidelines Project in 1980. They were a compilation of average felony sentences in Wis-
consin from 1977-1980. The guidelines for each crime used two matrices, accounting for various
characteristics of the offense and of the offender, to show the range of sentences imposed and the
percentage of cases where the offender was incarcerated.
Various counties implemented the guidelines on a voluntary basis in 1981 and 1982. In 1983,
the Advisory Committee requested that the Wisconsin Supreme Court mandate the use of the
guidelines and require a court which deviated from the guidelines to state its reasons for the depar-
ture. The court refused. It did, however, order that the statistical data on sentencing be collected
and disseminated to all judges for its informational value. In re Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 113
Wis. 2d 689, 335 N.W.2d 868 (1983).
In 1984, the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to promulgate its own felony sentencing
guidelines after the legislature authorized it to do so. As a consequence, the power to promulgate
sentencing rules passed to a sentencing commission. In re Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 120 Wis.
2d 198, 353 N.W.2d 793 (1984). Current law requires that a sentencing court take the guidelines
established by the sentencing commission into consideration when imposing sentence and state its
reasons for deviating from the guidelines on the record. Wis. STAT. § 973.012 (1987-1988). A defen-
dant whose sentence does not fall within the guidelines, however, has no right to appeal the sen-
tence. Id.
29. State ex rel. Warren v. County Court, 54 Wis. 2d 613, 620, 197 N.W.2d 1,4-5 (1972)
(rehabilitation goes not to excessiveness of a sentence but to the question of parole); State v.
Wuenseh, 69 Wis. 2d 467, 478, 230 N.W.2d 665, 671-72 (1975) (favorable consideration for the
defendant's change in attitude and progress lies solely within the province of the Department of
Health and Social Services); Jones (Hollis) v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 62, 72, 233 N.W.2d 441,447 (1975)
(defendant's progress in the rehabilitation system is a matter more properly considered by the
Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services).
30. See infra note 35 and text accompanying note 36.
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B. Ambiguities in the New Factor Definition
1. INFORMATION "UNKNOWINGLY OVERLOOKED" AT SENTENCING
If a fact or set of facts existed at the time of sentencing, it must
have been "unknowingly overlooked" by all of the parties to fit within
the Rosado new factor definition.3" In Rosado, the court held that the
defendant's explanation of a controversial incident was not unknow-
ingly overlooked."2 Because the defendant could have given his expla-
nation at the sentencing hearing and his counsel was fully aware that
the trial court considered the incident relevant to sentencing, the
supreme court interpreted the defendant's failure to testify as a "con-
scious tactical choice." 33 It is not clear how far the Rosado ruling
should extend to cases where the defendant may know of the existence
of certain facts but not realize their relevance at the time of sentencing.
A strict reading of the Rosado definition would conflict with earlier
decisions affirming sentence modifications based on new information
about the defendant's prior record.34 It follows from the court's rea-
soning in Rosado that correct information about a defendant's prior
record should not be a new factor. A defendant's prior record is in exis-
tence at the time of sentencing, is known to the defendant, and its rele-
vance to sentencing is also presumably known to the defendant's coun-
sel. The court in Rosado made no effort to harmonize its holding with
the prior record decisions, suggesting that it did not intend to overrule
them. Because of the conflict between the "unknowingly overlooked"
prong of the Rosado definition and earlier case law, the extent to which
information which is unknowingly overlooked by a defendant at sen-
tencing may be used to argue that a new factor exists is not clear.
2. INFORMATION "HIGHLY RELEVANT" TO SENTENCING
In 1983, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided two cases which
construed the "highly relevant" prong of the Rosado new factor defini-
tion. 35 The majority in State v. Hegwood held that a reduction in the
31. See supra text accompanying note 21.
32. See supra note 22.
33. State v. Rosado, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 289, 234 N.W.2d 69, 73 (1975).
34. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
35. State v. Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d 544, 335 N.W.2d 399 (1983) (ruling that a statutory
reduction in the maximum penalty for the crime for which the defendant had been convicted did
not constitute a new factor); State v. Macemon, 113 Wis. 2d 662, 335 N.W.2d 402 (1983) (ruling
that newly developed sentencing guidelines were not a new factor).
In Hegwood, the defendant was sentenced to 25 years for rape under a statute which pre-
scribed a maximum penalty of 30 years for the crime. Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d at 545, 334 N.W.2d at
400. Subsequently, the legislature passed a new sexual assault statute which carried a maximum
sentence of 20 years. The defendant brought a sentence modification motion asserting that the
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maximum penalty for the defendant's crime was not highly relevant to
the defendant's sentence because the legislature did not remit criminal
liability when it repealed the old law.36 Some of the language in the
Hegwood dissent and in the second case, State v. Macemon, suggests a
restrictive interpretation of the majority's decision.37 Under this inter-
pretation, a reduction in the maximum penalty for a defendant's crime
is not "highly relevant" because it does not mandate a reduction in the
defendant's sentence.
Such a restrictive interpretation would, as a practical matter, elimi-
nate the new factor ground for sentence modification. If a new factor
mandates a sentence reduction by definition, the trial court has discre-
tion to hear sentence modification motions only in cases where it has no
discretion to deny a defendant's motion.3" Although it is unlikely that
the Wisconsin Supreme Court intended to make such a sweeping
change in the law,39 the implications of the Hegwood and Macemon
decisions further confuse the status of the new factor ground for sen-
tence modification.4 °
statutory reduction in the maximum penalty was a new factor. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
ruled that the reduction in the maximum penalty for sexual assault was not highly relevant to the
imposition of sentence and, therefore, did not constitute a new factor.
In Macemon, the defendant was sentenced to 20 years for first-degree sexual assault.
Macemon, 113 Wis. 2d at 663, 334 N.W.2d at 404. The defendant brought a sentence modification
motion based on data from the Wisconsin felony sentencing guidelines (see supra note 28) which
indicated that the majority of sentences for first-degree sexaul assault in Wisconsin did not exceed
ten years. Id. at 665-66, 335 N.W.2d at 405. The court held that deviation from the guidelines did
not amount to a fact or set of facts which were highly relevant to the imposition of sentence.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text for the full Rosado new factor definition.
36. Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d at 548, 335 N.W.2d at 402.
37. The dissent in Hegwood characterized the majority as ruling that a reduction in the
maximum penalty for a crime is not a new factor "because the legislative reduction of the penalty is
not automatically retroactive." Id. at 549, 335 N.W.2d at 402 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). The
Hegwood dissent reasoned that a reduction in the maximum penalty for a crime is highly relevant
to sentencing because it indicates a change in the legislature's assessment of the gravity of the
offense. Id.
The restrictive interpretation is also reflected in Macemon, a case decided the same day as
Hegwood. See supra note 35. The court in Macernon did not fully reveal the reasoning in support of
its holding that data from sentencing guidelines are not "highly relevant" to a defendant's sen-
tence. The court noted only that the guidelines were "voluntary" and that Hegwood presented a
"stronger case" for a new factor. Macemon, 113 Wis. 2d at 669, 335 N.W.2d at 406-07.
38. See Comment, supra note 13, at 212-13 (arguing that there are few new facts which
would have a mandatory effect on the original sentence, and those facts could be presented to the
court as challenges to an illegal sentence under Wis. STAT. § 974.06 (1983-1984)).
In a recent case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court turned its focus from whether a fact man-
dates a sentence modification to what facts the trial court actually considered relevant to a defen-
dant's sentence. See the discussion of State v. Franklin at supra note 26.
39. See Comment, supra note 13, at 212-13.
40. The Hegwood majority might also be interpreted as reasoning that a statutory reduc-
tion in the penalty for a crime is not a new factor because such a reduction is not relevant to a
defendant's sentence at all. The court relied on WIs. STAT. § 990.04 (1981-1982), which provided
that "the repeal of a statute ... shall not remit, defeat or impair any civil or criminal liability for
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III. WISCONSIN TRIAL COURT ACTION ON SENTENCE
MODIFICATION MOTIONS
Despite confusing and conflicting case law, trial courts have used
their discretion to develop sentence modification into a flexible post-
conviction remedy which has served a variety of purposes. This study of
LAIP motions reveals that trial courts modified sentences in a variety of
cases where their intent in sentencing the defendant had been frus-
trated. Courts were reluctant, however, to grant sentence modifications
where the defendant alleged that the court's intent that the defendant
receive rehabilitative opportunities within the correctional system had
been frustrated.
Trial courts were sometimes willing to modify defendants'
sentences in response to events which occurred after sentencing, but
they were reluctant to push the limits of unclear appellate rulings on the
extent to which information "unknowingly overlooked" by a defendant
at sentencing can be considered a new factor. Motions based on a
change in a defendant's health or family circumstances were sometimes
successful. One trial court used sentence modification to reward a
defendant for cooperating with the district attorney after sentencing,
but other courts refused to modify sentences in cases where inmates
cooperated with prison authorities. Courts generally followed a policy
of non-interference when the defendant's needs could be met through
the administrative procedures of the Wisconsin Department of Health
and Social Services.
A. Frustration of Sentencing Judge's Intent
In Kutchera,4 1 the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that new infor-
mation about the defendant's parole eligibility qualified as a new factor
when the trial court had relied on incorrect information in passing sen-
tence.4 2 Trial courts went beyond this narrow ruling to correct
offenses committed ... under such statute before the repeal thereof... unless specially and ex-
pressly remitted, abrogated or done away with by the repealing statute." Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d at
547 n.3, 335 N.W.2d at 401 n.3. The court might have reasoned that a change in the maximum
penalty cannot be "highly relevant" to the defendant's sentence because the remittance statute
bars trial courts from abrogating the criminal liability of any defendant sentenced under the old
law. Such an interpretation is consistent with language in the majority opinion that characterizes
trial courts as "precluded" from retroactively reducing a defendant's sentence in the absence of
legislative action. Id. at 548, 335 N.W.2d at 401. A less restrictive interpretation would prevent
trial courts from reducing a defendant's sentence based on a later reduction in the maximum pen-
alty allowed by law, but would not infringe on trial court discretion to grant sentence modifica-
tions on other grounds.
41. Kutchera v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 534, 230 N.W.2d 750 (1975).
42. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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sentences in a variety of cases where the trial court's intent at sentencing
had been frustrated.
First, trial courts modified defendants' sentences where, as in
Kutchera, the trial judge misunderstood the effect of the defendant's
original sentence. In one case, for example, the trial court erroneously
believed that the sentence needed to be increased by eighty-one days to
enable the defendant to serve the sentence in a state prison rather than a
county jail.43 When the error was brought to the judge's attention, he
reduced the sentence to compensate for the misunderstanding. In an-
other case, the court had been mistaken about the amount of time that
a defendant would actually serve under a ten-year sentence running
concurrent to a previously imposed sentence." The court corrected its
mistake by modifying the sentence to a one-year consecutive sentence,
which reflected the amount of time the court intended that the defen-
dant serve.
Second, trial courts used sentence modification to correct clerical
or administrative errors which frustrated their sentencing intent.45 In
one case, for example, the judge granted a modification of thirty-eight
days. The defendant was mistakenly taken to a county jail instead of
state prison and, as a consequence, lost the opportunity to earn thirty-
eight days of good time that he would have earned in prison.46 Another
judge granted a sentence modification motion to correct a clerical error
at sentencing when he applied the wrong matrix from the Wisconsin
Felony Sentencing Guidelines in determining the defendant's
sentence.4 7
43. State v. 0., No. 81-CR-288 (Portage County Cir. Ct. Apr. 5, 1982) (granted). A
defendant sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than one year must serve the term in state
prison rather than in a county or municipal jail. WIs. STAT. § 973.02 (1987-1988). A defendant is
entitled to credit on his or her sentence for time served in coun.ty jail prior to sentencing. Wis. STAT.
§ 973.155(l)(a) (1987-1988). In this case, the defendant had spent 80 days in jail prior to sentencing.
The judge erroneously believed that the defendant needed to be sentenced to one year and 81 days
in order to serve the time in the state prison rather than in the county jail.
44. State v. W., No. J-1423 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. Apr. 18, 1979) (granted).
45. Many other states have statutes which allow trial courts to modify a criminal sen-
tence to correct purely clerical errors. See supra note 5.
46. State v. B., No. J-8473, J-9644, J-9847 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. Feb. 23, 1984).
A defendant convicted before 1984 is eligible to earn industrial good time which advances
the defendant's mandatory release date (the date on which an inmate must be released on parole).
WIS. STAT. § 53.11(1) (1987-1988); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § HSS 30.03(5) (Nov. 1987). Inmates subject
to the pre-1984 regulations earned up to five days'of good time per month. The defendant must
maintain an assignment in a vocational or educational program within the correctional system and
surpass the general average in diligence or study in order to earn good time. Wis. ADMIN. CODE
§ HSS 302.31(2) (Feb. 1987). Therefore, the opportunity to earn industrial good time was available
only to defendants within the state correctional system.
47. State v. G., No. K-1098 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 1981) (granted). See
supra note 28 for more information on the Wisconsin Felony Sentencing Guidelines.
1989:441 Sentence Modification
Third, a judge's intent may be frustrated when the sentence is
based on a specialized correctional program which does not material-
ize. The Youthful Offenders Act was an example of this situation. 48
LAIP brought five sentence modification motions on behalf of persons
sentenced under the Youthful Offenders Act. 9 Most motions asserted
that the defendants serving time under the Youthful Offenders Act were
not eligible to earn "good time" as were their adult counterparts. 50 One
motion framed the lack of specialized programs as a new factor. 5 ' In
three cases, judges modified the defendants' sentences to compensate
for the good time the defendants would have earned had they been sen-
tenced as adult offenders.
52
Finally, a judge's intent may be frustrated by problems which arise
in coordinating the defendant's Wisconsin sentence with sentences im-
posed in other jurisdictions. On one LAIP motion, for example, the
trial court modified the defendant's Wisconsin judgment of conviction
so that the defendant could serve the remainder of his Wisconsin sen-
tence in Montana.53 At sentencing, the court had expressed its intent
that the defendant's Wisconsin sentence run concurrent to a previously
imposed Montana sentence. Montana authorities subsequently issued a
warrant which had the effect of tolling the defendant's Montana sen-
tence until the defendant was returned to Montana. This made the Wis-
consin sentence consecutive in effect.
48. The Youthful Offenders Act was intended to provide a specialized correctional pro-
gram for offenders who were under age 21 and who, in the court's opinion, would benefit from the
program. WIs. STAT. §§ 54.01(2), 54.03(l)(b) (1975-1976). In part, the program called for those
sentenced under the Act to be segregated from adult inmates. Wis. STAT. § 54.17(6) (1975-1976) as
amended by 1975 Wis. Laws ch. 224, § 63. There were problems with the Act from the start. The
date by which youthful offenders were required to be segregated was delayed twice. Compare Act
published June 22, 1976, ch. 224, § 63, 1975 Wis. Laws 744, 778 (segregation mandated by July 1,
1977) with Act published July 9, 1977, ch. 29, § 659m, 1977 Wis. Laws 35, 174 (segregation man-
dated by July 1, 1978). The Act was finally repealed, effective July 1, 1978. Act published June 26,
1978, ch. 418, §§ 377, 930(18)(b), 1977 Wis. Laws 1553, 1642, 1839.
49. State v. F., No. 6000 (Outagamie County Cir. Ct. Aug. 9, 1977) (denied); State v. G.,
No. 1-9486 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. June 6, 1978) (granted); State v. L., No. 5611, 5612, 5584,
5583, 5632 (Marinette County Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 1979) (granted); State v. Me., No. 3335 (Vernon
County Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 1978) (granted); State v. Mo., No. 1-8675 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct.
Mar. 30, 1978) (denied).
50. See supra note 46 for an explanation of good time.
51. State v. L., No. 5611, 5612, 5584, 5583, 5632.
52. State v. L., No. 5611, 5612, 5584, 5583, 5632; State v. G., No. 1-9486; State v. Me.,
No. 3335.
53. State v. J., No. K-8962 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. May 13, 1985). The defendant
made a motion to modify his sentence and asked the court to modify the judgment of conviction as
an alternative remedy. The court chose to modify the judgment of conviction to provide that the
defendant's sentence could be served in the Montana correctional system and ordered that the
defendant be made immediately available to the Montana authorities for transfer.
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In another case, the defendant had escaped from a Wisconsin jail
while awaiting trial on a burglary charge.54 He was subsequently ar-
rested, convicted and sentenced to three years in Illinois for breaking
and entering. While incarcerated in Illinois, the defendant pled guilty to
the Wisconsin charges and received a concurrent Wisconsin sentence.55
Because of administrative policies, however, the defendant would have
been paroled in Illinois five months before being released from his Wis-
consin sentence. 56 The Wisconsin court modified the defendant's Wis-
consin sentences for burglary and escape to time served in Illinois.
B. Defendant's Rehabilitation
On the other hand, motions which argued that the court's intent
had been frustrated because the defendant was unable to participate in
rehabilitative opportunities were generally unsuccessful.57 A sentence
reduction can have an indirect effect on an inmate's eligibility to trans-
fer between institutions and participate in rehabilitative programs. 58
54. State v. S., No. 81-CR-12, 81-CR-13 (Iron County Cir. Ct. Dec. 17, 1981).
55. The motion was accompanied by a letter from the district attorney confirming that it
was the intent of the plea agreement that the defendant not serve any time in the Wisconsin system.
56. The motion asserted the defendant's ineligibility to earn industrial good time while
incarcerated in Illinois as one of the reasons for the disparity in the mandatory release dates.
57. LAIP brought II motions based on grounds that a defendant's sentence structure
was impeding his or her rehabilitation. One motion asserted that modification would allow the
defendant to take advantage of employment opportunities. State v. Wi., No. 84-CF-44 (Waupaca
County Cir. Ct. July 11, 1985) (denied; defendant had received a one-year leave of absence from
his job which was about to expire).
Four motions asked for modifications which would have allowed the defendant to take
advantage of educational opportunities. State v. A., No. 3-165-CR, 3-108-CR (Manitowoc
County Cir. Ct. June 9, 1978) (denied; release date came more than one month too late to start at
the state university at Oshkosh); State v. Hn., No. 82-CR-134 (Rock County Cir. Ct. July 3, 1985)
(denied; defendant wanted to transfer to a minimum security facility in order to obtain study
release to complete bachelor's degree); State v. L., No. 84-CR-623 (Brown County Cir. Ct. June
23, 1987) (denied; defendant wanted to transfer to an institution that would permit educational
opportunities away from the institution); State v. S., No. CR7720028 (Waupaca County Cir. Ct.
Sept. 11, 1979) (denied; defendant wanted early release to attend the state university at Oshkosh
where he had been accepted and would lose a financial aid award unless he could enroll).
Six motions asserted that modification would make the defendant eligible for rehabilitative
programs within the correctional system. State .v. B., No. 42856 (Winnebago County Cir. Ct. Oct.
21, 1977) (denied; psychiatric care); State v. D., No. 2-224024, 2-224025, 2-229711 (Milwaukee
County Cir. Ct. June 6, 1980) (granted; substance abuse program); State v. F., No. 65467 (Dunn
County Cir. Ct. July 29, 1976) (denied; drug treatment program); State v. Hy., No. 79-CR-124
(Green County Cir. Ct. Nov. 10, 1980) (denied; alcohol program); State v. K., No. 5178 (Rusk
County Cir. Ct. May 19, 1978) (denied; alcohol program); State v. Wa., No. 2616 (Dodge County
Cir. Ct. Jan. 8, 1979) (denied; alcohol program).
58. To be eligible for programs within the Wisconsin correctional system, an inmate
must have a security classification which permits transfer to the institution where the program is
offered. Wis. ADMIN. CODE § HSS 302.15(l) (Aug. 1979). One of the factors a prison director
considers in assigning an inmate's security classification is the length of the inmate's sentence. Wts.
ADMIN. CODE § HSS 302.14(3) (Aug. 1979). Therefore, although the Wisconsin Department of
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Wisconsin appellate courts have not explicitly ruled on whether a
defendant's ineligibility for rehabilitative programs is a new factor.59
One explanation for the failure of these motions is a growing senti-
ment that rehabilitation offered in a coercive correctional setting does
not work, or has not worked very well.60 In practice, trial judges
seemed to give the defendant's rehabilitative needs little weight at sen-
tencing.61 Therefore, evidence that the Wisconsin Department of
Health and Social Services' eligibility requirements limit a defendant's
opportunities for rehabilitation may not carry much weight in changing
the judge's original sentencing decision.
A second explanation for the difference in treatment is a general
policy of not interfering with matters that lie within the province of the
Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court has clearly stated that a defendant's institutional prog-
Health and Social Services is responsible for determining program eligibility, a trial judge can
affect the determination by reducing a defendant's sentence.
59. In State v. Wuensch, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was confronted with an appeal of
a trial court decision to grant a motion which may have been based on the defendant's ineligibility
for rehabilitative programs within the prison system. State v. Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d 467, 230
N.W.2d 665 (1975). In Wuensch, the defendant testified at his sentence modification hearing that
one of the reasons that he wanted a sentence reduction was to make him eligible for transfer from
the Green Bay Reformatory (a maximum security facility) to Fox Lake (a medium security facil-
ity). Fox Lake offered opportunities to enroll in a welding course and technical school. Id. at 471,
230 N.W.2d at 668. The defendant also testified that he had been told that it was department policy
not to allow prisoners with sentences longer than five years to be transferred to Fox Lake. Id. The
defendant maintained on appeal that this departmental rule satisfied the new factor test.
Instead of reaching the question of whether the defendant had asserted a new factor, the
court looked to the trial court's statement of reasons for granting the defendant's motion. The
court noted that the trial court's only stated reason for granting the defendant's motion was the
defendant's attitude and progress. The court then reversed the trial court on the grounds that
institutional progress is not a new factor. Id. at 478, 230 N.W.2d at 671-72. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
State v. Krueger, a court of appeals decision, suggests that inadequacy of rehabilitative pro-
grams may be a new factor. State v. Krueger, 119 Wis. 2d 327, 351 N.W.2d 738 (Ct. App. 1984). In
denying a defendant's sentence modification motion, the court stated that the trial court was aware
of the lack of such programs at sentencing. Id. at 333, 351 N.W.2d at 742. This leaves open the
possibility that the lack of rehabilitative programs may qualify as a new factor if the court was not
aware of the lack of programs for the defendant at the time of sentencing.
60. See generally F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF TE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981). The au-
thor sets forth several philosophical theories for why rehabilitation has fallen into disfavor, as well
as practical reasons why rehabilitation has failed.
61. In each of two LAIP motions brought on grounds of the defendant's eligibility for
rehabilitative programs, the court denied the motion because it had been aware at sentencing that
the sentence would have an adverse effect on the defendant's rehabilitative opportunities. See
State v. Wi, No. 84-CF-44; State v. L., No. 84-CR-623.
In a third case, the defendant asked for a reduction in sentence which would have facilitated
his transfer to a medium security facility. State v. F., No. 65467. The defendant was incarcerated in
a maximum security facility which did not have a drug treatment program. The court held that
there was no new factor. The court went on to say that even if it had jurisdiction to rule on the
merits of the motion, it would not have reduced the sentence because the nature of the offense and
the protection of the public outweighed the defendant's rehabilitative needs.
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ress is an issue for the parole board and, therefore, "lies solely within
the province of the department of health and social services." 62 For this
reason, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has consistently held that a
defendant's institutional progress or rehabilitation does not constitute
a new factor.63 Thus far, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not ex-
tended this policy to defeat motions brought on grounds of a defen-
dant's ineligibility for rehabilitative programs. At the trial court level,
however, a non-interference policy seemed to predominate in consider-
ing sentence modification motions based on these grounds.
64
C. Information Known to the Defendant at Sentencing
Trial courts were also reluctant to extend the limits of the "un-
knowingly overlooked at sentencing" prong of the Rosado new factor
definition. 65 LAIP motions brought on facts known to the defendant at
sentencing, for the most part, did not persuade trial courts to reduce the
sentence.66 In one case, the defendant revealed after sentencing that her
male co-defendant had beaten her and caused her to do things she
would otherwise not have done. 67 In another case, the defendant con-
ceded that he was "legally guilty" of burglary, but alleged that he had
believed at the time that he was retrieving property in payment of a debt
owed him by the owner. 68 Both motions were denied.
Even when new information involved the defendant's prior record,
which the supreme court has affirmed as a basis for sentence modifica-
62. Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d at 478, 230 N.W.2d at 671-72.
63. See supra note 29.
64. In denying LAIP motions, several trial courts expressed an unwillingness to interfere
with the Department of Health and Social Services' decisions. State v. A., No. 3-165-CR, 3-108-
CR (Manitowoc County Cir. Ct. June 9, 1978); State v. B., No. 42856 (Winnebago County Cir. Ct.
Oct. 21, 1977); State v. S., No. CR7720028 (Waupaca County Cir. Ct. Sept. 11, 1979); State v.
Wa., No. 2616 (Dodge County Cir. Ct. Jan. 8, 1979). In one case, the court stated that it felt
"constrained by the law." That court was sympathetic to the motion, however, and made
favorable comments on the record for the parole board's consideration. State v. Mn., No. 82-CR-
134 (Rock County Cir. Ct. July 3, 1985). In another case, the defendant requested that his proba-
tion be reinstated because of a lack of adequate psychological treatment in the maximum security
institution. The court stated that if the Department of Health and Social Services decided that the
defendant needed additional psychiatric care, it could transfer the defendant to a different institu-
tion where such care would be available. State v. B., No. 42856.
65. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
66. Of six LAIP motions asserting grounds based on facts known to the defendant at
sentencing, five were denied. State v. E., No. 6006 (Green County Cir. Ct. Mar. 22, 1977) (denied);
State v. F., No. 4870 (Dodge County Cir. Ct. Aug. 24, 1978) (granted); State v. H., No. 1-5844
(Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. June 7, 1984) (denied); State v. KI., No. 81-CF-232 (Kenosha County
Cir. Ct. June 7, 1984) (denied); State v. Kn., No. 1-286 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. Nov. 29, 1977)
(denied); State v. T., No. 6902 (Douglas County Cir. Ct. Feb. 23, 1979) (denied).
67. State v. KI., No. 81-CF-232.
68. State v. T., No. 6902.
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tion, 6 trial courts did not always grant sentence modifications."0
Whether an error as to a particular aspect of the defendant's prior
record was "highly relevant" may depend on the extent of the rest of the
defendant's criminal record."1 In the only successful LAIP motion
based on the defendant's prior record, the defendant sought to have a
one-year sentence for escape modified.72 A court in the county where he
was incarcerated imposed the escape sentence. The defendant brought
to the court's attention that his original conviction for burglary had
recently been vacated in the county of conviction. The trial court modi-
fied the defendant's escape sentence to time served.
Trial courts' reluctance to grant motions based on facts known to
the defendant at sentencing may rest on conflicting policy considera-
tions. Allowing a judge to consider the most accurate information
whenever it is revealed promotes the goal of accurate fact finding. On
the other hand, allowing a defendant to raise such information might
encourage defendants to withhold information to gain another appear-
ance before the judge.
D. Defendant's Deteriorated Health
Although a defendant's health is not one of the primary factors
considered at sentencing,7 3 a change in a defendant's health may have
an impact on the factors a trial court considers at sentencing. If an ill-
ness is sufficiently life-threatening, the court's original sentence may
have increased in severity and become a "life" sentence. 7' If a defen-
dant's health problem is so debilitating that the defendant will be physi-
cally unable to commit further crimes, the defendant's health would be
relevant to the need to protect society against him or her. Wisconsin
case law is silent, however, on whether a defendant's deteriorated
health meets the new factor defintion.
69. See supra note 24.
70. State v. F., No. 4870, State v Kn., and State v. H., No. 1-5844, No. I286, involved
mistakes about the defendant's prior record.
71. In one case, the court responded to the assertion that it had been misinformed re-
garding the defendant's successful completion of a prior probation period by detailing the defen-
dant's three other criminal convictions. State v. H., No. 1-5844.
72. State v. F., No. 4870.
73. The three major factors to be considered at sentencing are the gravity of the offense,
the character (or rehabilitative needs) of the defendant, and the need to protect the public. Klimas
v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 244, 247, 249 N.W.2d 285, 287 (1976).
74. LAIP was successful in obtaining the modification of a defendant's eight-year armed
robbery sentence where the defendant had acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). At-
tached to the motion was a physician's report that estimated that the defendant's life expectancy
was four to eight months. The defendant's family had made arrangements for him to live with
them after release. State v. T., No. K-9501 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. Feb. 25, 1987).
1989:441
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
LAIP had limited success with motions based on the defendant's
deteriorated health, but trial judges generally did not favor motions
brought on these grounds. 75 Trial courts articulated two reasons for
denying LAIP motions based on health. First, where one trial court was
aware of the defendant's condition at sentencing, the trial judge found
that the defendant had failed to assert a new factor.7 6 Second, trial
courts sometimes articulated a policy of non-interference with matters
that lie within the province of the Wisconsin Department of Health and
Social Services.77
E. Change in Family Circumstances
A defendant's circumstances may also change when the defen-
dant's family meets with hardship. The effect on the family and society
may distinguish this ground from the health ground, which affects pri-
marily the defendant alone. Two LAIP motions which asserted the
defendant's family hardship as a new factor were granted.78 In both
cases, the defendant was a woman, her crime was non-violent, she had a
short sentence and she was the only one available to help the family.79
75. Only two out of nine LAIP motions brought on the grounds of the defendant's dete-
riorated health were successful. State v. T., No. K-9501 (granted; defendant had AIDS); State v.
B., No. L-2866 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. Apr. 25, 1986) (denied; motion based on defendant's
mental retardation); State v. H., No. 1-704, 1-1932 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. Oct. 17, 1978)
(denied; motion based on recent diagnosis that defendant had muscular dystrophy); State v. L.,
No. 264-399, 264-392 (Dane County Cir. Ct. Aug. 31, 1979) (granted; defendant had surgery to
remove a brain tumor and was partially paralyzed as a result); State v. R., No. H-5544, H-9114
(Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. May 4, 1979) (denied; motion based on defendant's hypertension and
coronary bypass surgery); State v. S., No. E-9861, E-9863 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. Mar. 30,
1981) (denied; defendant underwent coronary bypass surgery); State v. V., No. 4893, 4894, 4869
(La Crosse County Cir. Ct. June 23, 1987) (denied; motion based on defendant's diabetic condi-
tion); State v. Wa., No. 80-CR-210 (Lincoln County Cir. Ct. Aug. 4, 1982) (denied; motion based
on diagnosis of defendant's skin rash as pustular psoriasis); State v. Wi., No. 562 (Clark County
Cir. Ct. July I1, 1985) (denied; motion based on defendant's pancreatitis and varicose veins in the
stomach which necessitated an operation to remove defendant's spleen).
76. For example, a trial judge denied one motion, stating, "I had the benefit of a thor-
ough presentence investigation. I had considered the facts [sic] that he had mental retardation.... I
don't believe this is really a new factor or new information other than there is a more thorough
examination of him." Transcript of Proceedings on Sentence Modification Motion at 9, State v.
B., No. L-2866. (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. July 24, 1986).
77. In denying the motion, one trial court stated that a defendant's bypass surgery and
hypertension were matters that the parole board should consider. State v. R., No. H-5544, H-0 114.
In denying another motion, a court stated that "whatever changes in the defendant's position have
been brought about by the physical malady to which the petitioner has become subject are within
the control of the State Department of Health and Social Services and any change in his future
status should be left to that agency." Transcript of Proceedings at 3, State v. H., No. 1-704, 1-1932
(Oct. 16, 1978).
78. State v. S., No. 4962 (La Crosse County Cir. Ct. Nov. 29, 1979); State v. G., No. I-
8317 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1979).
79. Both defendants were serving two-year sentences: one for theft (State v. S., No.
4962) and one for party to the crime of robbery (State v. G., No. 1-8317).
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The trial courts modified both sentences in ways that brought about the
defendants' immediate release.8 °
F. Cooperation with Authorities
A trial court may modify a sentence where the defendant cooper-
ated with the state after sentencing and where the district attorney sup-
ported the motion. Wisconsin case law is silent on whether such co-
operation qualifies as a new factor. LAIP motions that asserted
cooperation with authorities fell into two categories. One motion as-
serted that the defendant had cooperated with the district attorney in
another prosecution."1 Other motions were based on the defendant's
cooperation with prison authorities regarding incidents within the
prison. 
2
Where the defendant cooperated with the district attorney after
sentencing, one court was willing to modify the defendant's sentence.
83
Receptiveness to sentence modification in such a case may reflect a rec-
ognition that after a defendant is sentenced, the district attorney has no
power to reward an inmate for cooperation. Inmate testimony may be
important to the interests of the justice system if such testimony is
needed to help convict guilty parties. Before a cooperating defendant is
convicted, a district attorney may offer concessions in exchange for tes-
timony. Once the cooperating defendant has been sentenced, the most a
district attorney can offer is support for a defendant's sentence modifi-
cation motion or support at a defendant's parole hearing.
One trial court was willing to modify a sentence where the defen-
dant cooperated with prison authorities. A desire to encourage disclo-
sure of potentially dangerous situations within a prison is a defensible
basis upon which to grant sentence modification motions. In one case,
the court granted such a motion.8 4 Another court, however, invoked a
80. In one case, the court granted a motion to modify the sentence to one year, nine
months and 27 days. This allowed the defendant to be released immediately to return to Illinois to
support her father who was in poor health and her mother who was about to lose her job. State v.
G., No. 1-8317.
In the other motion the court modified the sentence to 10 months. The defendant was preg-
nant when she was sentenced, although no one was aware of that fact at sentencing. The defen-
dant's family was unable to care for the child and it would have had to be placed in a foster home
until the defendant's release. State v. S., No. 4962.
81. State v. B., No. G-6215, G-6216 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. Sept. 15, 1983)
(granted).
82. State v. M., No. 83-CF-44 (Waupaca County Cir. Ct. May 7, 1984) (granted, then
vacated, see infra note 84); State v. S., No. 113115 (Kenosha County Cir. Ct. May 7, 1982)
(denied).
83. The district attorney agreed to support the motion in return for the inmate's co-
operation in a Wisconsin Department of Justice investigation. State v. B., No. G-6215, G-6216.
84. One LAIP motion cited as new factors the defendant's report of an assault, subse-
quent cooperation with the investigation, and the danger to which the defendant was exposed as a
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non-interference policy that trial courts employ when matters are under
the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services' jurisdic-
tion.8 The Department has the power to reward an inmate for disclo-
sure of a dangerous situation.8 6 It is also the Department's job to pro-
tect inmates if they are in danger as a result of the cooperation.
Therefore, it seems legitimate for a court to invoke the non-interference
policy in these situations.
IV. COMPARISON OF COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY SYSTEMS
As this study shows, trial courts have used Wisconsin's common
law sentence modification system for a wide variety of purposes. Statu-
tory exceptions from other states address some of the grounds that Wis-
consin trial courts have accepted as new factors. For example, a New
Jersey statute provides an exception to the sixty-day limit usually appli-
cable to sentence modification to permit a defendant's release because
of the defendant's illness or infirmity.8" Indiana and New Jersey have
statutory exceptions allowing a trial court to modify a sentence if the
district attorney supports the defendant's motion. 8 A South Carolina
statute allows a trial court to modify a defendant's sentence where the
defendant's prior criminal record was not taken into account at sen-
tencing, a situation similar to that addressed in Wisconsin appellate
rulings.8 9
An explicit statutory mandate may broaden a trial court's per-
ceived authority to modify sentences. For example, Wisconsin trial
courts were left to weigh the conflicting policy considerations involved
in modifying sentences based on information known to the defendant
but not brought out at sentencing. In contrast, Nevada law gives trial
courts a broad mandate to modify a defendant's sentence where the
sentence was based on "materially untrue assumptions" and where the
result of that cooperation. The trial court granted the motion. However, the district attorney
moved the court to reconsider the reduction. When the court realized that the sentence reduction
would result in the inmate's release in two months, it vacated the sentence modification, stating
that the defendant should not yet be released. State v. M., No. 83-CF-44 (Waupaca County Cir.
Ct. June 25, 1984).
85. One LAIP motion included a letter from the Department of Health and Social Ser-
vices commending the defendant for his cooperation and stating that he was probably in danger
because of his cooperation. Nonetheless, the court stated that it was the department's job to pro-
tect the inmate and that cooperation was for the parole board to consider. State v. S., No. 113115.
86. The Department of Health and Social Services can grant the inmate a parole hear-
ing. Wis. ADMIN. CODE § HSS 30.04 (Sept. 1984). It can also transfer the inmate to another
institution.
87. See supra note 5.
88. Id.
89. Id. The scope of the South Carolina law may be narrower than the Wisconsin ruling
because the South Carolina statute does not, on its face, allow courts to reduce a sentence if the
defendant's record is less serious than the court initially believed.
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defendant suffers extreme detriment as a result.9" Similarly, most trial
courts have chosen to employ a policy of non-interference into the
province of the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services
and have refused to modify defendants' sentences to allow them to take
advantage of rehabilitation opportunities.9 The New Jersey legislature
has expressly given trial courts the power to modify a sentence to allow
a defendant to participate in a custodial or non-custodial drug or alco-
hol rehabilitation program. 92 Because the legislature presumably
weighed the conflicting policies, the trial courts may feel freer to modify
sentences on these grounds.
93
No one state is able, however, through narrowly drawn statutory
exceptions, to provide the range of relief that Wisconsin trial courts are
able to offer. The Wisconsin common law system is especially well-
suited to develop sentence modification as a remedy to correct the ef-
fects of misinformation or error on a defendant's sentence. Although
many state statutes allow trial judges to correct clerical errors in a sen-
tence, 94 the cases in this study demonstrate that a judge's sentencing
intent can be frustrated in ways that go beyond clerical errors. Wiscon-
sin trial courts were able to respond to administrative errors, changes in
institutional programs, or the actions of other sentencing jurisdictions.
It is unlikely that a statute could capture this variety of circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
Judged by published case law alone, Wisconsin's common law sys-
tem has failed to articulate a clear "new factor" definition. The Rosado
definition leaves unclear the extent to which information known to a
defendant at sentencing will be considered to have been "unknowingly
overlooked." The Wisconsin Supreme Court has added to the confu-
sion with rulings that may be interpreted as saying that only facts that
mandate a sentence reduction meet the "highly relevant" prong of the
Rosado definition. The court has found new factors in only three cases,
all decided prior to the court's articulation of the new factor definition.
The view of sentence modification at the trial court level presented
in this Comment paints a different picture. Trial courts went beyond the
narrow Kutchera ruling and used sentence modification to effect their
sentencing intent when it was frustrated by a misunderstanding about
90. See supra note 4.
91. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 5.
93. A court that has the discretion to modify may, however, choose not to exercise that
discretion in some cases. For example, see supra text accompanying notes 69-72 for a discussion of
some Wisconsin trial courts' reluctance to modify a defendant's sentence based on an error in his
or her prior criminal record.
94. See supra note 5.
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the effect of the sentence or by administrative or clerical errors. Trial
courts also modified sentences when specialized correctional programs
failed to materialize and to coordinate a defendant's Wisconsin sen-
tence with sentences in other jurisdictions. Trial courts sometimes re-
duced sentences based on a defendant's failing health or family hard-
ship. One trial court was willing to use sentence modification to reward
a defendant for cooperating with the district attorney after being
sentenced.
Nonetheless, trial courts used sentence modification conservatively
and followed general policies set out in case law. Trial courts applied
the general policy against interference with the functions of the Wiscon-
sin Department of Health and Social Services in deciding motions
based on a defendant's health, cooperationwith prison authorities, and
rehabilitative needs. They were reluctant to modify sentences to allow a
defendant access to rehabilitative programs. They were similarly reluc-
tant to test the limits of the new factor definition on the extent to which
information known to the defendant at sentencing may be considered a
new factor. Even in the face of clear appellate rulings allowing sentence
reduction based on information about the defendant's prior record,
trial courts did not always grant sentence reductions.
Viewed as a whole, Wisconsin's common law sentence modifica-
tion system has proven to be a successful experiment in state post-con-
viction criminal procedure. State statutory exceptions to a trial court's
lack of jurisdiction provide more explicit guidance to trial courts in de-
ciding whether to modify a defendant's sentence in some cases. Statu-
tory exceptions allowing trial courts to modify sentences in narrowly
specified circumstances do not, however, allow trial courts the flexibil-
ity to modify sentences that trial courts have enjoyed under the Wiscon-
sin common law system.
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